

On the Web

The religion and society of Islam (http://www.islamic.org/Mosque/), Islam’s revealed text, the Qur’an (http://islam.org/mosque/arabicscript/1/1.html) and its arts (http://islamicart.com/), set new standards for civilization for much of the world. Islam sought submission to the will of God, Allah (http://www.usc.edu/dept.MSA/fundamentals/tawheed/), through the message vouchsafed to the Prophet Muhammad (http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/prophet/), whose immediate successor as leader of the fledgling Muslim community, Abu Bakr (http://www.erols.com/zenithco/abubakr.html) proved equal to the task of ensuring its survival.

The evolution of Islamic art from its Arab roots, its capacity to influence non-Islamic art, and its capacity for synthesis of non-Arab themes can be traced at http://islamicart.com/main/architecture/impact.htm. The golden age of Islamic science, literature and scholarship, as well as religious philosophy, can be studied at http://islamic.org/Mosque/GC/knowledge.htm. A gorgeous site explicating the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca can be found at http://www.the-webplaza.com/hajj/index.html.
Chapter 7

Abbasid Decline and the Spread of Islamic Civilization to South and Southeast Asia

The richness and depth attained by Muslim civilizations in the far-flung regions in which they were found is illustrated by this seventeenth-century, miniature painting of a scholar-poet in an imagined nighttime garden in Kashmir in northern India. The meditative figure with book in hand and framed by the flowering tree in the background captures the commitment to learning and refined aesthetic sense that was cultivated by members of the elite classes throughout the Islamic world.
By the mid-9th century C.E., the Abbasid dynasty had begun to lose control over the vast Muslim empire that had been won from the Umayyads a century earlier. From north Africa to the Iranian heartlands, rebellious governors and new dynasties arose to challenge the Abbasid caliphs' claims to be the rightful overlords of all Islamic peoples. As was the case with the Umayyads, the Abbasids' ability to hold together the highly diversified empire they claimed in the 750s was greatly hampered by the difficulties of moving armies and compelling local administrators to obey orders across the great distances that separated the capital at Baghdad from the provinces they sought to rule. Travel by land and sea was slow and often dangerous. Most of the peoples of the empire maintained regional identities rather than an attachment to the caliphal regime at Baghdad. Also, Abbasid control was limited by the fact that the military technology of the rebel forces was often equal, and at times superior, to their own. In addition to the splintering of the empire into often hostile states, the Abbasids had to contend with periodic revolts. Shi'i dissenters, belonging to a growing variety of sects, were particularly troublesome. Major slave revolts and more localized peasant uprisings also sapped the strength of the empire. The Abbasids' ability to meet these challenges was steadily diminished by the decline in the quality of Abbasid leadership. In addition, there was a sharp decrease in resources available to even the more able of the later caliphs, caused by losses in territory and control over the revenues collected by regional officials. When Mongol invasions finally put an end to the caliphate in the mid-13th century, it was only a shadow of the great empire that had once ruled much of the Islamic world.

Paradoxically, even as the political power of the Abbasids declined and the Muslim world broke into a patchwork of rival kingdoms and empires, Islamic civilization reached new heights of creativity and entered a new age of expansion. In architecture and the fine arts, in literature and philosophy, and in mathematics and the sciences, the centuries during which the Abbasid Empire slowly declined were an era of remarkable achievement. At the same time, political fragmentation did little to slow the growth of the Islamic world through political conquest and more enduring peaceful conversion. From the 10th to the 14th century, Muslim warriors, traders, and wandering mystics carried the faith of Muhammad into the savanna and desert of west Africa, down the coast of east Africa, to the Turks and many other nomadic peoples of central Asia, and into south and southeast Asia. For more than five centuries, the spread of Islam played a central role in the rise, extension, or transformation of civilization in much of the Afro-Asian world.
### 700 C.E. | 800 C.E. | 900 C.E. | 1000 C.E. | 1200 C.E.
---|---|---|---|---
604–646 Harsa's empire in India | 800 Independent dynasty established in Tunisia | 945 Persian Buyids capture Baghdad, caliphs made into puppet rulers | c. 1020 Death of Ferdowsi, author of the Shah-Nama | 1206 Establishment of the Delhi sultanate in India
661–750 Umayyad caliphate (Damascus) | 809 First war of succession between Abbasid princes | 973–1050 Life of al-Kindi, scientist | 1055 Seljuk Turks overthrow Buyids, control caliphate | 1290s Beginning of the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia
711–713 First Muslim raids into India | 813–833 Reign of al-Munmun; first mercenary forces recruited | 1094–1099 First Christian Crusade in Palestine | 1291 Fall of Acre, last Crusader stronghold in Middle East | 1298 Fall of Baghdad to Mongols; end of Abbasid caliphate
750 Establishment of the Abbasid caliphate (Baghdad) | 865–925 Life of al-Razi; physician and scientist | 1111 Death of al-Ghazzali, philosopher and scientist | 1123 Death of Omar Khayyam, scientist and poet | 1258
775–785 Reign of al-Mahdi | | | | |
777 Independent dynasty established in Algeria | | | | |
786–809 Reign of al-Rashid | | | | |
788 Independent dynasty established in Morocco | | | | |

In the early sections of this chapter, we consider the forces that led to the decline of the Abbasid caliphate and the resulting political fragmentation of the Islamic world. The next sections focus on the great artistic and scientific accomplishments that Muslim peoples managed in the midst of political and social turmoil, and often in defiance of it. The last sections of the chapter explore the patterns and impact of Islamic expansion into south and southeast Asia. The spread of Islam into Africa is treated in Chapter 8.

**The Islamic Heartlands in the Middle and Late Abbasid Era**

The vast Abbasid empire, shown at its peak in Map 7.1, gradually disintegrated between the 9th and 13th centuries. Revolts spread among the peasants, slavery increased, and the position of women was further eroded. Divisions within the empire opened the way for Christian crusaders from western Europe to invade and, for a short time, establish warrior kingdoms in the Muslim heartlands. Political decline and social turmoil were offset for many by the urban affluence, inventiveness, and artistic creativity of the Abbasid age.

As early as the reign of the third Abbasid caliph, al-Mahdi (775–785), the courtly excesses and political divisions that eventually contributed to the decline of the empire were apparent. Al-Mahdi’s efforts to reconcile the moderates among the Shi‘i opposition to Abbasid rule ended in failure. This meant that Shi‘i revolts and assassination attempts against Abbasid officials would plague the dynasty to the end of its days. Al-Mahdi also abandoned the frugal ways of his predecessor. In the brief span of his reign, he established a taste for luxury and monumental building and surrounded himself with a multitude of dependent wives, concubines, and courtiers. These habits would prove to be an ever greater financial drain in the reigns of later caliphs.

Perhaps most critically, al-Mahdi failed to solve the vexing problem of succession. Not only did he waver between which of his older sons would succeed him, he allowed his wives and concubines, the mothers of different candidates, to become involved in the palace intrigues that became a standard feature of the transfer of power from one caliph to the next. Although a full-scale civil war was avoided after al-Mahdi’s death, within a year his eldest son and successor was poi-
soned. That act cleared the way for one of the most famous and enduring of the Abbasid caliphs, Harun al-Rashid (786–809), to ascend the throne.

Imperial Extravagance and Succession Disputes

Emissaries sent in the early 9th century to Baghdad from Charlemagne, then the most powerful monarch in Christian Europe, provide ample evidence that Harun al-Rashid shared his father’s taste for sumptuous living. Harun al-Rashid dazzled the Christians with the splendor of Baghdad’s mosques, palaces, and treasure troves, which is reflected in the painting of nightlife in a palace in Figure 7.1. He also sent them back to Charlemagne with presents, including an intricate water clock and an elephant, that were literally worth a king’s ransom.

The luxury and intrigue of Harun’s court have also been immortalized by the tales of *The Thousand and One Nights* (see the Document in Chapter 6), set in the Baghdad of his day. The plots and maneuvers of the courtesans, eunuchs, and royal ministers related in the tales suggest yet another source of dynastic weakness. Partly because he was only 23 at the time of his accession to the throne, Harun became heavily dependent, particularly in the early years of his reign, on a family of Persian advisors. Although he eventually resisted their influence, the growth of the power of royal advisors at the expense of the caliphs became a clear trend in succeeding reigns. In fact, from the mid-9th century onward, most caliphs were pawns in the power struggles between different factions at the court.

Harun al-Rashid’s death prompted the first of several full-scale civil wars over succession. In itself, the precedent set by the struggle for the throne was deeply damaging. But it had an additional consequence that would all but end the real power of the caliphs. The first civil war convinced the sons of al-Ma’mun
(813–833), the winner, that they needed to build personal armies in anticipation of the fight for the throne that would break out when their father died. One of the sons, the victor in the next round of succession struggles, recruited a "bodyguard" of some 4000 slaves, mostly Turkic-speaking nomads from central Asia. On becoming caliph, he increased this mercenary force to more than 70,000.

Not surprisingly, this impressive force soon became a power center in its own right. In 846, slave mercenaries murdered the reigning caliph and placed one of his sons on the throne. In the next decade, four more caliphs were assassinated or poisoned by the mercenary forces. From this time onward, the leaders of the slave mercenary armies were often the real power behind the Abbasid throne and were major players in the struggles for control of the capital and empire.

Between stints of military service, which the mercenaries became more and more adept at keeping to a minimum or avoiding altogether, they became a rowdy and volatile element in the capital and garrison towns into which they crowded. They bullied the local populace and quarreled, often violently, among themselves. As the central government's revenues fell to a small fraction of the taxes collected, the mercenaries' salaries and provisions were increasingly late in being paid or meager when they arrived. As a result, the mercenaries became a major force for violent social unrest, and they were often the catalyst for the food riots that broke out periodically in the capital and other urban centers.
Imperial Breakdown 
and Agrarian Disorder

In the last decades of the 9th century, the dynasty brought the slave armies under control for a time, but at a great cost. Constant civil violence drained the treasury and alienated the subjects of the Abbasids. A further strain was placed on the empire’s dwindling revenues by some caliphs’ attempts to escape the turmoil of Baghdad by establishing new capitals near the original one. The construction of palaces, mosques, and public works for each of these new imperial centers added to the already exorbitant costs of maintaining the court and imperial administration. Of course, the expense fell heavily on the already hard-pressed peasantry of the central provinces of the empire, where some imperial control remained. The need to support growing numbers of mercenary troops also increased the revenue demands on the peasantry. Lacking the bureaucratic means to pay a regular salary to the commanders of the mercenary forces and stipends for their troops, the Abbasid regime gave the revenues from various parts of the empire to these military chiefs and their retainers. Some of the commanders were concerned about the welfare of the village populations under their control. These officials tried to improve irrigation and cropping patterns that would enhance the revenues they received over the long term. Unfortunately, the majority of the mercenary leaders tried to exact as much as possible from the peasants.

Spiraling taxation and outright pillaging led to the destruction or abandonment of many villages in the richest provinces of the empire. The great irrigation works that had for centuries been essential to agricultural production in the fertile Tigris–Euphrates basin fell into disrepair, and in some areas they collapsed entirely. Some peasants perished through flood, famine, or violent assault; others fled to wilderness areas beyond the reach of the Abbasid tax farmers or to neighboring kingdoms. Some formed bandit gangs or joined the crowds of vagabonds that trudged the highways and camped in the towns of the imperial heartland. At times, bandits and vagabonds were involved in food riots in the towns or local peasant rebellions that broke out periodically during the later Abbasid period. In many cases, dissident religious groups, such as the various Shi’i sects, instigated these uprisings. Shi’i participation meant that these movements sought not only to correct the official abuses that had occurred under the Abbasid regime but to destroy the dynasty itself.

The Declining Position of Women in the Family and Society

The harem and the veil became the twin emblems of women’s increasing subjugation to men and confinement to the home in the Abbasid era. Although the seclusion of women had been practiced by some Middle Eastern peoples since ancient times, the harem was a creation of the Abbasid court. The wives and the concubines of the Abbasid caliphs were restricted to the forbidden quarters of the imperial palace. Many of the concubines were slaves, who could win their freedom and gain power by bearing healthy sons for the rulers. The growing wealth of the Abbasid elite created a great demand for female and male slaves, who were found by the tens of thousands in Baghdad and other large cities. Most of these urban slaves continued to perform domestic services in the homes of the wealthy. One of the 10th-century caliphs is said to have had 11,000 eunuchs among his slave corps; another is said to have kept 4000 slave concubines.

Most of the slaves had been captured or purchased in the non-Muslim regions surrounding the empire, including the Balkans, central Asia, and Sudanic Africa. They were purchased in the slave markets found in all of the larger towns of the empire. Female and male slaves were prized for both their beauty and their intelligence. Some of the best-educated men and women in the Abbasid Empire were slaves. Consequently, caliphs and high officials often spent more time with their clever and talented slave concubines than with their less well-educated wives. Slave concubines and servants often had more personal liberty than freeborn wives. Slave women could go to the market, and they did not have to wear the veils and robes that were required for free women in public places.

Over the centuries, the practice of veiling spread from women of the urban elite to all classes in town and country. As the stories in The Thousand and One Nights make clear, seclusion and veiling were seen as essential ways of curbing the insatiable lust that supposedly possessed all women from puberty. Because men were considered incapable of resisting the lures and temptations of women, it was deemed essential that the two be segregated except within the confines of their own families’ households.
Although women from the lower classes farmed, wove clothing and rugs, or raised silkworms to help support their families, rich women were allowed almost no career outlets beyond the home. Often married at puberty (legally set at age 9), women were raised to devote their lives to running a household and serving their husbands. But at the highest levels of society, wives and concubines cajoled their husbands and plotted with eunuchs and royal advisors to advance the interests of their sons and win for them the ruler’s backing for succession to the throne. Despite these brief incursions into power politics, by the end of the Abbasid era, the freedom and influence—both within the family and in the wider world—that women had enjoyed in the first centuries of Islamic expansion had been severely curtailed.

Nomadic Incursions and the Eclipse of Caliphal Power

Preoccupied by struggles in the capital and central provinces, the caliphs and their advisors were powerless to prevent further losses of territory in the outer reaches of the empire. In addition, areas as close to the capital as Egypt and Syria broke away from Abbasid rule (see Map 7.1). More alarmingly, by the mid-10th century, independent kingdoms that had formed in areas that were once provinces of the empire were moving to supplant the Abbasids as lords of the Islamic world. In 945, the armies of one of these regional splinter dynasties, the Buyids of Persia, invaded the heartlands of the Abbasid Empire and captured Baghdad. From this point onward, the caliphs were little more than puppets controlled by families such as the Buyids. Buyid leaders took the title of sultan, which literally means victorious in Arabic, but came to designate Muslim rulers, especially in the West. These sultans and their dependents soon became the real rulers of what was left of the Abbasid Empire.

The Buyids controlled the caliph and the court, but they could not prevent the further disintegration of the empire. In just over a century, the Buyids’ control over the caliphate was broken, and they were supplanted in 1055 by another group of nomadic invaders from central Asia via Persia, the Seljuk Turks. For the next two centuries, Turkic military leaders ruled the remaining portions of the Abbasid Empire in the name of caliphs, who were usually of Arab or Persian extraction. The Seljuks were staunch Sunnis, and they moved quickly to purge the Shi’i officials who had risen to power under the Buyids and to rid the caliph’s domains of the Shi’ite influences the Buyids had tried to promote.

For a time, the Seljuk military machine was also able to restore political initiative to the much-reduced caliphate. Seljuk victories ended the threat of conquest by a rival Shi’i dynasty centered in Egypt. They also humbled the Byzantines, who had hoped to take advantage of Muslim divisions to regain some of their long-lost lands. The Byzantines’ crushing defeat was particularly important because it opened the way to the settlement of Asia Minor, or Anatolia, by nomadic peoples of Turkic origins. The region later formed the nucleus of the powerful Ottoman Empire, and today it makes up the greater part of Turkey, the national home of the Turkic peoples.

The Impact of the Christian Crusades

Soon after seizing power, the Seljuks faced a very different challenge to Islamic civilization. It came from Christian crusaders, knights from western Europe (see Chapter 10) who were determined to capture the portions of the Islamic world that made up the Holy Land of biblical times. Muslim political divisions and the element of surprise made the first of the crusaders’ assaults, between 1096 and 1099, by far the most successful. Much of the Holy Land was captured and divided into Christian kingdoms. In June 1099, the main objective of the Crusade, Jerusalem, was taken, and its Muslim and Jewish inhabitants were massacred by the rampaging Christian knights.

For nearly two centuries, the Europeans, who eventually mounted eight Crusades that varied widely in strength and success, maintained their precarious hold on the eastern Mediterranean region. But they posed little threat to the more powerful Muslim princes, whose disregard for the Christians was demonstrated by the fact that they continued to quarrel among themselves despite the intruders’ aggressions. When united under a strong leader, as they were under Saladin (known as Salah-ud-Din in Christian Europe) in the last decades of the 12th century, the Muslims rapidly reconquered most of the crusader outposts. Saladin’s death in 1193 and the subsequent breakup of his kingdom gave the remaining Christian citadels some respite. But the last of the crusader kingdoms was lost with the fall of Acre in 1291.

Undoubtedly, the impact of the Crusades was much greater on the Christians who launched them
Ibn Khaldun on the Rise and Decline of Empires

Although he lived in the century after the Abbasid Caliphate was destroyed in 1258, Ibn Khaldun was very much a product of the far-flung Islamic civilization that the Abbasids had consolidated and expanded. He was also one of the greatest historians and social commentators of all time. After extensive travels in the Islamic world, he served as a political advisor at several of the courts of Muslim rulers in north Africa. With the support of a royal patron, Ibn Khaldun wrote a universal history that began with a very long philosophical preface called *The Muqaddimah*. Among the subjects he treated at length were the causes of the rise and fall of dynasties. The shifting fortunes of the dynasties he knew well in his native north Africa, as well as the fate of the Abbasids and earlier Muslim regimes, informed his attempts to find persistent patterns in the confusing political history of the Islamic world. The following passages are from one of the most celebrated sections of *The Muqaddimah* on the natural life span of political regimes.

We have stated that the duration of the life of a dynasty does not as a rule extend beyond three generations. The first generation retains the desert qualities, desert toughness, and desert savagery. [Its members are used to] privation and to sharing their glory [with each other]; they are brave and rapacious. Therefore, the strength of group feeling continues to be preserved among them. They are sharp and greatly feared. People submit to them.

Under the influence of royal authority and a life of ease, the second generation changes from the desert attitude to sedentary culture, from privation to luxury and plenty, from a state in which everybody shared in the glory to one in which one man claims all the glory for himself while the others are too lazy to strive for [glory], and from proud superiority to humble subservience. Thus, the vigor of group feeling is broken to some extent. People become used to lowliness and obedience. But many of [the old virtues] remain in them, because they had direct personal contact with the first generation and its conditions....

The third generation, then, has [completely] forgotten the period of desert life and toughness, as if it had never existed. They have lost [the taste for] group feeling, because they are dominated by force. Luxury reaches its peak among them, because they are so much given to a life of prosperity and ease. They become dependent on the dynasty and are like women and children who need to be defended [by someone else]. Group feeling disappears completely. People forget to protect and defend themselves and to press their claims. With their emblems, apparel, horseback riding, and fighting skill, they deceive people and give them the wrong impression. For the most part, they are more cowardly than women upon their backs. When someone comes and demands something from them, they cannot repel him. The ruler, then, has need of other, brave people for his support. He takes many clients and followers. They help the dynasty to some degree, until God permits it to be destroyed, and it goes with everything it stands for.

Three generations last one hundred and twenty years... As a rule, dynasties do not last longer than that many years, a few more, a few less; save when, by chance, no one appears to attack [the dynasty]. When senility becomes preponderant [in a dynasty], there may be no claimant [for its power, and then nothing will happen] but if there should be one, he will encounter no one capable of repelling him. If the time is up [the end of the dynasty] cannot be postponed for a single hour, no more than it can be accelerated.

Questions: What does this passage reveal about Ibn Khaldun’s views of the contrasts between nomads and urban dwellers? Why does he see the former as a source of political strength? What forces undermine dynasties in later generations? How well do these patterns correspond to the history of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties we have studied? How well do they work for other civilizations we have examined? Can elements of Ibn Khaldun’s theory be applied to today’s political systems? If so, which and how? If not, why not?
Muslim techniques of building fortifications were adopted by many Christian rulers, as can be seen in the castles built in Normandy and coastal England by William the Conqueror and his successors in the 11th and 12th centuries. Richard the Lionhearted's legendary preference for Muslim over Christian physicians was but one sign of the Europeans' avid centuries-old interest in the superior scientific learning of Muslim peoples.

From Muslims and Jews in Spain, Sicily, Egypt, and the Middle East, the Europeans recovered much of the Greek learning that had been lost to northern Europe during the waves of nomadic invasions after the fall of Rome. They also mastered Arabic (properly Indian) numerals and the decimal system, and they benefited from the great advances Arab and Persian thinkers had made in mathematics and many of the sciences. The European demand for Middle Eastern rugs and textiles is demonstrated by the Oriental rugs and tapestries that adorned the homes of the European upper classes in Renaissance and early modern paintings. It is also reflected in European (and our own) names for different kinds of cloth, such as fustian, taffeta, muslin, and damask, which are derived from Persian terms or the names of Muslim cities where the cloth was produced and sold.

Muslim influences affected both the elite and popular cultures of much of western Europe in this period. These included Persian and Arabic words, games such as chess (like numbers, passed on from India), chivalric ideals, and troubadour ballads, as well as foods such as dates, coffee, and yogurt. Some of these imports, namely the songs of the troubadours, can be traced directly to the contacts the crusaders made in the Holy Land. But most were part of a process of exchange that extended over centuries. In fact, the Italian merchant communities, which remained after the political and military power of the crusaders had been extinguished in the Middle East, probably contributed a good deal more to this exchange than all the forays of Christian knights.

Of perhaps even greater significance, the "exchange" was largely a one-way process. Although they imported items such as fine glassware, weapons, and horses from Christian Italy and Byzantium, and beeswax, slaves, and timber from Russia and the Balkans, Muslim peoples in this era showed little interest in the learning or institutions of the West. The Crusades reflected this imbalance. They had only a marginal effect on political and military developments in the Middle East, and, if anything, their cultural impact on Islamic civilization was even less.

AN AGE OF LEARNING AND ARTISTIC REFINEMENT

The avid interest in Muslim ideas and material culture displayed by European knights and merchants in this era cautions us against placing too great an emphasis on the political divisions and struggles that were so prominent in the later Abbasid era. It also invites comparison with neighboring civilizations, such as those of India and western Europe, that were much more fragmented and racked by warfare in late Abbasid times. In the midst of the political turmoil and social tensions of the Abbasid age, Muslim thinkers and artisans living in kingdoms from Spain to Persia created, refined, and made discoveries in a remarkable range of fields. Their collective accomplishments mark one of the great ages of human ingenuity and creativity. Their thought and techniques influenced their counterparts in virtually all the civilized centers of the Eastern Hemisphere, from the Sudanic peoples of Africa to the Iberians and Franks of western Europe, and from the Hindus of India to the distant and relatively isolated Chinese.

Although town life became more dangerous, the rapid growth and increasing prosperity that characterized the first centuries of Muslim expansion continued until late in the Abbasid era. Expanding bureaucracies and caliphal building projects meant that employment opportunities for the well-educated and for skilled artisans remained abundant. Despite the declining revenue base of the caliphate and deteriorating conditions in the countryside, there was a great expansion of the professional classes, particularly doctors, scholars, and legal and religious experts. Muslim, Jewish, and in some areas Christian entrepreneurs amassed great fortunes supplying the cities of the empire with staples such as grain and barley, essentials such as cotton and woolen textiles for clothing, and luxury items such as precious gems, citrus fruits, and sugar cane. Long-distance trade between the Middle East and Mediterranean Europe and between coastal India and island southeast Asia, in addition to the overland caravan trade with China, flourished through much of the Abbasid era (see Map 7.1).

Among the chief beneficiaries of the sustained urban prosperity were artists and artisans, who con-
continued the great achievements in architecture and the crafts that had begun in the Umayyad period. Mosques and palaces grew larger and more ornate in most parts of the empire. Even in outlying areas, such as Cordoban Spain, which is pictured in Figure 7.2, Muslim engineers and architects created some of the great architectural treasures of all time. The tapestries and rugs of Muslim peoples, such as the Persians, were in great demand from Europe to China. To this day, Muslim rugs have rarely been matched for their exquisite designs, their vivid colors, and the skill with which they are woven. Muslim artisans also produced fine bronzes and superb ceramics. Deep blue, glazed tiles were among the most striking ceramics. The Persians used these tiles with stunning effect on the domes and walls of their mosques and palaces. Also noteworthy were the wonderfully designed pitchers and bowls that were fashioned for everyday use in the Abbasid era but have become museum pieces in our day.

The Full Flowering of Persian Literature

As Persian wives, concubines, advisors, bureaucrats, and—after the mid-10th century—Persian caliphs came to play central roles in imperial politics, Persian gradually replaced Arabic as the primary written language at the Abbasid court. Arabic remained the language of religion, law, and the natural sciences. But Persian was favored by Arabs, Turks, and Muslims of Persian descent as the language of literary expression, administration, and scholarship. In Baghdad and major cities throughout the Abbasid Empire and in neighboring kingdoms, Persian was the chief language of “high culture,” the language of polite exchanges between courtiers as well as of history, poetic musings, and mystical revelations.

Written in a modified Arabic script and drawing selectively on Arabic vocabulary, the Persian of the Abbasid age was a supple language as beautiful to look at when drafted by a skilled calligrapher as it was to read aloud (see Figure 7.3). Catch phrases (“A jug of wine, a loaf of bread—and Thou”) from the *Rubaiyat* of Omar Khayyam are certainly the pieces of Persian literature best known in the West. But other writers from this period surpassed Khayyam in profundity of thought and elegance of style. Perhaps the single most important work was the lengthy epic poem *Shahb-Nama* (Book of Kings), written by Firdawsi in the late 10th and early 11th centuries. The work relates the history of Persia from the begin-

nings of time to the Islamic conquests, and it abounds in dramatic details of battles, intrigues, and illicit love affairs. Firdawsi’s Persian has been extolled for its grand, musical virtuosity, and portions of the *Shahb-Nama* and other Persian works were read aloud to musical accompaniment. Brilliantly illustrated manuscripts of Firdawsi’s epic history are among the most exquisite works of Islamic art.

In addition to historical epics, Persian writers in the Abbasid era wrote on many subjects, from doomed love affairs and statecraft to incidents from everyday life and mystical striving for communion with the divine. One of the great poets of the age, Sa’di, fuses an everyday message with a religious one.
Have I told you not to lose hold of my skirt?"
A tiny child cannot walk out alone,
For it is difficult to take a way not seen;
You too, poor friend, are but a child upon
endeavour's way:
Go, seize the skirts of those who know the way!

This blend of the mystical and commonplace was
widely adopted in the literature of this period. It is
epitomized in the Rubiyat, whose author is much
more concerned with finding meaning in life and a
path to union with the divine than with extolling the
delights of picnics in the garden with beautiful women.

Achievements in the Sciences

From preserving and compiling the learning of the
ancient civilizations they had conquered in the early
centuries of expansion, Muslim peoples—and the
Jewish scholars who lived peacefully in Muslim
lands—increasingly became creators and inventors in
t heir own right. For several centuries, which spanned
much of the period of Abbasid rule, Islamic civiliza-
tion outstripped all others in scientific discoveries,
new techniques of investigation, and new technolo-
gies. The many Muslim accomplishments in these
areas include major corrections to the algebraic and
geometric theories of the ancient Greeks and great
advances in the use of basic concepts of trigonomety:
the sine, cosine, and tangent.

Two discoveries in chemistry that were funda-
mental to all later investigation were the creation of
the objective experiment and al-Razi’s scheme of clas-
sifying all material substances into three categories:
animal, vegetable, and mineral. The sophistication
of Muslim scientific techniques is indicated by the fact
that in the 11th century, al-Biruni was able to calcu-
late the specific weight of 18 major minerals. This
sophistication was also manifested in astronomical
instruments such as those in Figure 7.4, developed
through cooperation between Muslim scholars and
skilled artisans. Muslim technicians greatly improved
devices such as the astrolabe and armillary sphere for
measuring and mapping the position of celestial bod-
ies. Muslim astronomers reorganized and renamed
the constellations, and some of these names, such as
Altair and Betelgeuse, are still used today. Their astro-
nomical tables and maps of the stars were in great
demand among scholars of other civilizations, includ-
ing those of Europe and China.

As these breakthroughs suggest, much of the
Muslims’ work in scientific investigation had very
ceramic firing—that had been devised earlier in China. In addition, Muslim scholars made some of the world's best maps, which were copied by geographers from Portugal to Poland.

**Religious Trends and the New Push for Expansion**

The contradictory trends in Islamic civilization—social strife and political divisions versus expanded trading links and intellectual creativity—were strongly reflected in patterns of religious development in the later centuries of the caliphate. On one hand, a resurgence of mysticism injected Islam with a new vibrancy. On the other, orthodox religious scholars, such as the *ulama*, grew increasingly suspicious of and hostile to non-Islamic ideas and scientific thinking. The Crusades had promoted the latter trend. This was particularly true regarding Muslim borrowing from ancient Greek learning, which the ulama associated with the aggressive civilizations of Christian Europe. Many orthodox scholars suspected that the questioning that characterized the Greek tradition undermined the absolute authority of the Quran. They insisted that the Quran was the final, perfect, and complete revelation of an all-knowing divinity. Brilliant thinkers such as *al-Ghazali*, perhaps the greatest Islamic theologian, struggled to fuse the Greek and Quranic traditions. Their ideas were often rejected by orthodox scholars.

Much of the religious vitality in Islam in the later Abbasid period was centered on the Sufist movement. Like the Buddhist and Hindu ascetics earlier in India, *Sufis* (whose title was derived from the woolen robes they wore) were wandering mystics who sought a personal union with Allah. In its various guises—including both Sunni and Shi'i manifestations—Sufism was a reaction against the impersonal and abstract divinity that many ulama scholars argued was the true god of the Quran. Like the Indian mystics, the Sufis and their followers tried to see beyond what they believed to be the illusory existence of everyday life and to delight in the presence of Allah in the world. True to the strict monotheism of Islam, most Sufis insisted on a clear distinction between Allah and humans. But in some Sufist teachings, Allah permeated the universe in ways that appeared to compromise his transcendent status.

Some Sufis gained reputations as great healers and workers of miracles; others led militant bands that tried to spread Islam to nonbelievers. Some Sufis used asceticism or bodily denial to find Allah; others used meditation, songs, drugs, or (in the case of the

Figure 7.4 This 15th-century Persian miniature of a group of Arab scientists testing and working with a wide variety of navigational instruments conveys a strong sense of the premium placed on scientific investigation in the Muslim world in the Abbasid age and the centuries thereafter. Muslim prototypes inspired European artisans, cartographers, and scientists to develop instruments and maps, which were essential to European overseas expansion from the 14th century onward.

practical applications. This practical bent was even greater in other fields. For example, Muslim cities such as Cairo boasted some of the best hospitals in the world. Doctors and pharmacists had to follow a regular course of study and pass a formal examination before they were allowed to practice. Muslim scientists did important work on optics and bladder ailments. Muslim traders introduced into the Islamic world and Europe many basic machines and techniques—namely, papermaking, silk-weaving, and
The Patterns of Islam’s Global Expansion

The following table shows the present-day distribution of Muslims in key countries from West Africa to China. It indicates the total number of Muslims in each of the countries represented, the percentage of Muslims in the total population of that area, and the numbers and percentages of other religious groups. The table also indicates the manner in which Islam was spread to each of these areas and the key agents of that diffusion. After using the table to compare the patterns of Islamization in different areas, answer the questions that follow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Population (2000 est.)</th>
<th>Total Number of Muslims</th>
<th>Percentage of Muslims</th>
<th>Total Number of non-Muslims</th>
<th>Percentages of Other Religious Groups</th>
<th>Principle Agents/ Modes of Conversion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>114 million</td>
<td>57 million</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57 million</td>
<td>40–Christian; 10–Other (African religions)</td>
<td>Trading Contacts Sufi Missionaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>67 million</td>
<td>63 million</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>4 million</td>
<td>4–Christian; 2–Other</td>
<td>Arab Migration Voluntary Mass Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>22.5 million</td>
<td>21.8 million</td>
<td>97; Shi‘i: 60–65; Sunni: 32–37</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>3–Other (Zoroastrian, Christian, Jewish)</td>
<td>Arab Migration Voluntary Mass Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>65 million</td>
<td>64.35 million</td>
<td>99; Shi‘i: 89; Sunni: 10</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>1–Other (Zoroastrian, Bahai, Christian, Jewish)</td>
<td>Arab Migration Voluntary Mass Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>138 million</td>
<td>133.85 million</td>
<td>97; Shi‘i: 20; Sunni: 77</td>
<td>4.15 million</td>
<td>3–Other (Hindu, Christian, Buddhist)</td>
<td>Sufi Missionaries Voluntary Mass Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.001 billion</td>
<td>140.1 million</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>860.9 million</td>
<td>80–Hindu; 6–Other (Buddhist, Sikh, Christian)</td>
<td>Sufi Missionaries Trading Contacts Voluntary Mass Conversion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions: Which areas have the highest absolute numbers of Muslims in the present day? Is this distribution what you would have expected or is it surprising? What factors might explain these distribution patterns? What were the main ways that Islam was transmitted to most areas? And to the areas with the largest number of Muslims? What does this say about the popular notion that Islam was historically a militant religion spread primarily by forcible conversion? Does Islam appear to be able to coexist with other faiths?
CHAPTER 7  Abbasid Decline and the Spread of Islamic Civilization to South and Southeast Asia

continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population (2000 est.)</th>
<th>Total Number of Muslims</th>
<th>Percentage of Muslims</th>
<th>Total Number of non-Muslims</th>
<th>Percentages of Other Religious Groups</th>
<th>Principle Agents/ Modes of Conversion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>216 million</td>
<td>188 million</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>28 million</td>
<td>6-Protestant; 7–Other (Catholic, Buddhist, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>79.5 million</td>
<td>3 million</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>75.5 million</td>
<td>82–Catholic; 9–Protestant; 3–Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>30 million</td>
<td>29.7 million</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1–Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


famous dervishes) ecstatic dancing. Most Sufis built up a sizable following, and the movement as a whole was a central factor in the continuing expansion of the Muslim religion and Islamic civilization in the later centuries of the Abbasid caliphate.

**New Waves of Nomadic Invasions and the End of the Caliphate**

As we have seen, in the 10th and 11th centuries, the Abbasid domains were divided by ever-growing numbers of rival successor states. In the early 13th century, a new threat arose at the eastern edge of the original Abbasid domains. Another central Asian nomadic people, the Mongols, united by their great war commander, Chinggis Khan, first raided in the 1220s and then smashed the Turko-Persian kingdoms that had developed in the regions to the east of Baghdad. Chinggis Khan died before the heartlands of the Muslim world were invaded, but his grandson, Hulegu, renewed the Mongol assault on the rich centers of Islamic civilization in the 1250s. In 1258, the Abbasid capital at Baghdad was taken by the Mongols, and much of it was sacked. The 37th and last Abbasid caliph was put to death by the Mongols. They then continued westward until they were finally defeated by the Mameluks, or Turkic slaves, who then ruled Egypt. Baghdad never recovered from the Mongol attacks. In 1401, it suffered a second capture and another round of pillaging by the even fiercer forces of Tamerlane. Baghdad shrank from the status of one of the great cities of the world to a provincial backwater. It was gradually supplanted by Cairo to the west and then Istanbul to the north.

**THE COMING OF ISLAM TO SOUTH ASIA**

From the 7th century onward, successive waves of Muslim invaders, traders, and migrants carried the Islamic faith and elements of Islamic civilization to much of the vast south Asian subcontinent (see Map 7.2). By the 12th and 13th centuries, Muslim dynasties ruled much of north and central India. Muslim conquests and growing numbers of conversions provoked a variety of Hindu responses. They also prompted efforts on the part of some followers of both religions to reconcile their differences. Although these measures resulted only in an uneasy standoff between the two communities, Islamic influences had clearly become a major force in south Asian historical development. They added further layers of richness and complexity to Indian civilization as well as some of its most enduring linkages to the peoples and cultures of neighboring lands.
All through the millennia when a succession of civilizations from Harappa to the brahmanic empire of the Guptas developed in south Asia, foreigners had entered India in waves of nomadic invaders or as small bands of displaced peoples seeking refuge. Invariably, those who chose to remain were assimilated into the civilizations they encountered in the lowland areas. They converted to the Hindu or Buddhist religion, found a place in the caste hierarchy, and adopted the dress, foods, and lifestyles of the farming and city-dwelling peoples of the many regions of the subcontinent. This capacity to absorb peoples moving into the area resulted from the strength and flexibility of India’s civilizations and from the fact that India’s peoples usually enjoyed a higher level of material culture than migrant groups entering the subcontinent. As a result, the persistent failure of Indian rulers to unite against aggressors meant periodic disruptions and localized destruction but not fundamental challenges to the existing order. All of this changed with the arrival of the Muslims in the last years of the 7th century C.E.

With the coming of the Muslims, the peoples of India encountered for the first time a large-scale influx of bearers of a civilization as sophisticated, if not as ancient, as their own. They were also confronted by a religious system that was in many ways the very opposite of the ones they had nurtured. Hinduism, the predominant Indian religion at that time, was open, tolerant, and inclusive of widely varying forms of religious devotion, from idol worship to meditation in search of union with the spiritual source of all creation. Islam was doctrinaire, proselytizing, and committed to the exclusive worship of a single, transcendent god.

Socially, Islam was highly egalitarian, proclaiming all believers equal in the sight of God. In sharp contrast, Hindu beliefs validated the caste hierarchy. The latter rested on the acceptance of inborn differences between individuals and groups and the widely varying levels of material wealth, status, and religious purity these differences were believed to produce. Thus, the faith of the invading Muslims was religiously more rigid than that of the absorptive and adaptive
Hindus. But the caste-based social system of India was much more compartmentalized and closed than the society of the Muslim invaders, with their emphasis on mobility and the community of believers.

Because growing numbers of Muslim warriors, traders, Sufi mystics, and ordinary farmers and herders entered south Asia and settled there, extensive interaction between invaders and the indigenous peoples was inevitable. In the early centuries of the Muslim influx, conflict, often violent, predominated. But there was also a good deal of trade and even religious interchange between them. As time passed, peaceful (if wary) interaction became the norm. Muslim rulers employed large numbers of Hindus to govern the largely non-Muslim populations they conquered, mosques and temples dominated different quarters within Indian cities, and Hindu and Muslim mystics strove to find areas of agreement between their two faiths. Nonetheless, tensions remained, and periodically they erupted into communal rioting or warfare between Hindu and Muslim lords.

North India on the Eve of the Muslim Invasions

After the collapse of the Gupta Empire at the end of the 5th century, the heads of many regional dynasties tried to restore imperial unity in north India. But until Harsha in the early 7th century, all imperial ambitions were frustrated by alliances of rival lords that checked the rise of a single, unifying power center. Harsha was the second son of one of these rival kings. Through a series of wars Harsha’s father had carved out a modest domain in the Punjab region to the southeast of the Indus River system. Upon his father’s death in 604, Harsha’s elder brother ascended the throne. He was soon killed in a plot by rival princes. Although still a youth, Harsha agreed to accept the imperiled throne and was soon at war with neighboring kingdoms. The young king proved skilful at forging alliances with other rulers; he also was a talented military commander. Soon after ascending the throne, he won a series of battles that avenged his brother’s murder and increased the territories under his control. Within a matter of years, he had pieced together the largest empire India had seen since the fall of the Gupta dynasty more than a century earlier.

At the height of his power, Harsha ruled much of the central and eastern Gangetic plain. His empire was a good deal smaller than that of the Guptas yet a good deal larger than any political system in Europe at that time. His attempts to expand into southern and northwest India were unsuccessful. Thus, although he was one of the most powerful rulers India knew from the time of the Guptas until the establishment of the Delhi sultanate in the 13th century, Harsha’s conquests fell far short of his hopes to unite the Indian subcontinent.

The wars that dominated the early years of Harsha’s reign gave way to a long period of peace and prosperity for his empire. Content with his early conquests, and too greatly feared by rival rulers to be attacked, Harsha turned his energies to promoting the welfare of his subjects. He built roads and rest houses for weary travelers, established hospitals, and endowed temples and Buddhist monasteries. A Chinese pilgrim named Xuan Zang visited the Buddhist shrines of India during Harsha’s reign. Xuan wrote that as the king toured the provinces he held audiences for the common people in a special pavilion that was set up alongside the main roads. Judging from Xuan Zang’s account, the prosperity of the Gupta age had been largely restored during Harsha’s reign. This was particularly true in large towns such as the capital, Kanauj, which had formidable walls, palatial homes, and beautiful gardens with artificial tanks or pools. Some of the artistic creativity of the Gupta age was revived during Harsha’s long reign. He himself was a talented author and wrote at least three Sanskrit plays. He befriended and generously patronized philosophers, poets, artists, and historians.

Although he was probably a Hindu devotee of the god Shiva in his early years, Harsha was tolerant of all faiths and became increasingly attracted to Buddhism. His generous patronage of Buddhist monasteries and monks attracted pilgrims such as Xuan Zang. If Xuan Zang’s account can be trusted, Harsha came close to converting to Buddhism in the last years of his life. He sponsored great religious assemblies, which were dominated by Buddhist monks and religious rituals, and he prohibited eating meat and killing humans, even for serious crimes. His lavish patronage of the Buddhists led on one occasion to a brahman-inspired assassination attempt, which appears only to have strengthened his preference for Buddhist ceremonies and beliefs.

Political Divisions and the First Muslim Invasions

Harsha died without a successor in 646, and his kingdom was quickly pulled apart by ambitious ministers attempting to found new dynasties of their own. Although Hindu culture flourished in both north and south India in the centuries after Harsha’s death—as
evidenced by the great temples and works of sculpture, literature, and music that were produced—no paramount kingdom emerged. Political divisions in the north and west central regions of the subcontinent proved the most significant because they left openings for a succession of invasions by different Muslim peoples.

The first and least enduring Muslim intrusion, which came in 711, resulted indirectly from the peaceful trading contacts that had initially brought Muslims into contact with Indian civilization. Since ancient times, Arab seafarers and traders had been major carriers in the vast trading network that stretched from Italy in the Mediterranean to the South China Sea. After converting to Islam, these traders continued to visit the ports of India, particularly those on the western coast. An attack by pirates sailing from Sind in western India, (see Map 7.2) on ships owned by some of these Arab traders prompted Hajjaj, the viceroy of the eastern provinces of the Umayyad Empire, to launch a punitive expedition against the king of Sind. An able Arab general, Muhammad ibn Qasim, who was only 17 years old when the campaign began, led more than 10,000 horse- and camel-mounted warriors into Sind to avenge the assault on Arab shipping.

After victories in several fiercely fought battles and successful sieges of the great stone fortresses that stood guard over various parts of the arid and sparsely populated Sind interior, Muhammad ibn Qasim declared the region, as well as the Indus valley to the northeast, provinces of the Umayyad Empire. Soon after the territories had been annexed, a new caliph, who was a bitter enemy of Hajjaj, came to power in Damascus. He purged Hajjaj, and he recalled and executed his son-in-law, Muhammad ibn Qasim. Although the personnel of the ruling Arab elite shifted as a result, the basic policies established by Muhammad ibn Qasim were followed by his Umayyad and Abbasid successors for several centuries.

In these early centuries, the coming of Islam brought little change for most inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent. In fact, in many areas, local leaders and the populace surrendered towns and districts willingly to the conquerors because they promised lighter taxation and greater religious tolerance. The Arab overlords decided to treat both Hindus and Buddhists as protected “people of the book,” despite the fact that their faiths had no connection to the Bible, the book in question. This meant that although they were obliged to pay special taxes, non-Muslims, like Jews and Christians, enjoyed the freedom to worship as they pleased.

As in other areas conquered by the Arabs, most of the local officials and notables retained their positions, which did much to reconcile them to Muslim rule. The status and privileges of the brahman castes were respected. Nearly all Arabs, who made up only a tiny minority of the population, lived in cities or special garrison towns. Because little effort was expended in converting the peoples of the conquered areas, they remained overwhelmingly Hindu or Buddhist. Initially at least, the peoples of the area showed little interest in the beliefs or culture of their new overlords.

Indian Influences on Islamic Civilization

Although the impact of Islam on the Indian subcontinent in this period was limited, the Arab foothold in Sind provided contacts by which Indian learning was transmitted to the Muslim heartlands in the Middle East. As a result, Islamic civilization was enriched by the skills and discoveries of yet another great civilization. Of particular importance was Indian scientific learning, which rivaled that of the Greeks as the most advanced of the ancient world. Hindu mathematicians and astronomers traveled to Baghdad after the Abbasids came to power in the mid-8th century. Their works on algebra and geometry were translated into Arabic, and their instruments for celestial observation were copied and improved by Arab astronomers.

Most critically, Arab thinkers in all fields began to use the numerals that Hindu scholars had devised centuries earlier. Because these numbers were passed on to the Europeans through contacts with the Arabs in the early Middle Ages, we call them Arabic numerals today, but they originated in India. Because of the linkages between civilized centers established by the spread of Islam, this system of numerical notation has proved central to two scientific revolutions. The first in the Middle East was discussed earlier in this chapter. The second, discussed in Chapter 16, occurred in Europe some centuries later. From the 16th century to the present, it has brought fundamental transformations to both Europe and much of the rest of the world.

In addition to science and mathematics, Indian treatises on subjects ranging from medicine to music were translated and studied by Arab scholars. Indian
physicians were brought to Baghdad to run the well-endowed hospitals that the Christian crusaders found a source of wonderment and a cause for envy. On several occasions, Indian doctors were able to cure Arab rulers and officials whom Greek physicians had pronounced beyond help. Indian works on statecraft, alchemy, and palmistry were also translated into Arabic, and it is believed that some of the tales in the *Arabian Nights* were based on ancient Indian stories. Indian musical instruments and melodies made their way into the repertoires of Arab performers, and the Indian game of chess became a favorite of both royalty and ordinary townspeople.

Arabs who emigrated to Sind and other Muslim-ruled areas often adopted Indian dress and hairstyles, ate Indian foods, and rode on elephants as the Hindu rajas (kings) did. As Figure 13.5 illustrates, the conquerors also adopted Indian building styles and artistic motifs. In this era, additional Arab colonies were established in other coastal areas, such as Malabar to the south and Bengal in the east (see Map 7.2). These trading enclaves later provided the staging areas from which Islam was transmitted to island and mainland southeast Asia.

**From Booty to Empire: The Second Wave of Muslim Invasions**

After the initial conquests by Muhammad ibn Qasim’s armies, little territory was added to the Muslim foothold on the subcontinent. In fact, disputes between the Arabs occupying Sind and their quarrels with first the Umayyad and later the Abbasid caliphs gradually weakened the Muslim hold on the area. This was reflected in the reconquest of parts of the lower Indus valley by Hindu rulers. But the gradual Muslim retreat was dramatically reversed by a new series of military invasions, this time launched by a Turkish slave dynasty that in 962 had seized power in Afghanistan to the north of the Indus valley. The third ruler of this dynasty, *Mahmud of Ghazni*, led a series of expeditions that started nearly two centuries of Muslim raiding and conquest in northern India. Drawn by the legendary wealth of the subcontinent and a zeal to spread the Muslim faith, Mahmud repeatedly raided northwest India in the first decades of the 11th century. He defeated one confederation of Hindu princes after another, and he drove deeper

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**Figure 7.5** Built in 1626 at Agra, this exquisite tomb of white marble encrusted with semiprecious stones is a superb example of the blending of Islamic and Hindu architectural forms, building materials, and artistic motifs. Although this structure was built centuries after the first Muslims entered India, from the outset this blending of traditions was evident.
and deeper into the subcontinent in the quest of ever richer temples to loot.

The raids mounted by Mahmud of Ghazni and his successors gave way in the last decades of the 12th century to sustained campaigns aimed at seizing political control in north India. The key figure in this transition was a tenacious military commander of Persian extraction, Muhammad of Ghur. After barely surviving several severe defeats at the hands of Hindu rulers, Muhammad put together a string of military victories that brought the Indus valley and much of north central India under his control. In the following years, Muhammad's conquests were extended along the Gangetic plain as far as Bengal, and into west and central India, by several of his most gifted subordinate commanders. After Muhammad was assassinated in 1206, Qutb-ud-din Aibak, one of his slave lieutenants, seized power.

Significantly, the capital of the new Muslim empire was at Delhi along the Jumna River on the Gangetic plain. Delhi’s location in the very center of northern India graphically proclaimed that a Muslim dynasty rooted in the subcontinent itself, not an extension of a Middle Eastern central Asian empire, had been founded. For the next 300 years, a succession of dynasties ruled much of north and central India. Alternately of Persian, Afghan, Turkic, and mixed descent, the rulers of these imperial houses proclaimed themselves the sultans of Delhi (literally, princes of the heartland). They fought each other, Mongol and Turkic invaders, and the indigenous Hindu princes for control of the Indus and Gangetic heartlands of Indian civilization.

All the dynasties that laid claim to the sultanate based their power on large military machines. These were anchored on massive contingents of cavalry and increasingly on corps of war elephants patterned after those that local rulers had used for centuries. The support of their armies and sumptuous court establishments became the main objectives of the extensive bureaucracies that each ruler at Delhi tried to maintain. Some rulers patronized public works projects, the arts, and charity. But most concentrated on maximizing the revenues they could collect from the peasants and townspeople in their domains. However, throughout the Delhi sultanate era, factional struggles among the ruling Muslims, and their dependence on Hindu lords and village notables in local administration, greatly limited the actual control exercised by any of these dynasties.

Patterns of Conversion

Although the Muslims fought their way into India, their interaction with the indigenous peoples soon came to be dominated by accommodation and peaceful exchanges. Over the centuries when much of the north was ruled by dynasties centered at Delhi, sizable Muslim communities developed in different areas of the subcontinent. The largest of these were in Bengal to the east and in the northwestern areas of the Indus valley that were the points of entry for most of the Muslim peoples who migrated into India.

Few of these converts were won forcibly. The main carriers of the new faith were merchants, who played a growing role in both coastal and inland trade, and especially Sufi mystics. The latter shared much with Indian gurus and wandering ascetics in both style and message. Belief in their magical and healing powers enhanced the Sufis’ stature and increased their following. Their mosques and schools often became centers of regional political power. Sufis organized their devotees in militias to fend off bandits or rival princes, oversaw the clearing of forests for farming and settlement, and welcomed low-caste and outcaste Hindu groups into Islam. After their deaths, the tombs of Sufi mystics became objects of veneration for Indian Muslims as well as Hindu and Buddhist pilgrims.

Most of the indigenous converts, who came to form a majority of the Muslims living in India, were drawn from specific regions and social groups. Surprisingly small numbers of converts were found in the Indo-Gangetic centers of Muslim political power, a fact that suggests the very limited importance of forced conversions. Most Indians who converted to Islam were from Buddhist or low-caste groups. In areas such as western India and Bengal, where Buddhism had survived as a popular religion until the era of the Muslim invasions, esoteric rituals and corrupt practices had debased Buddhist teachings and undermined the morale of the monastic orders.

This decline was accelerated by Muslim raids on Buddhist temples and monasteries, which provided vulnerable and lucrative targets for the early invaders. Without monastic supervision, local congregations sank further into orgies and experiments with magic. All of these trends opposed the Buddha’s social concerns and religious message. Disorganized and misdirected, Indian Buddhism was no match for the confident and vigorous new religion the Muslim invaders carried into
the subcontinent. This was particularly true when those who were spreading the new faith had the charisma and organizing skills of the Sufi mystics.

Buddhists probably made up the majority of Indians who converted to Islam. But untouchables and low-caste Hindus, as well as animistic tribal peoples, were also attracted to the more egalitarian social arrangements promoted by the new faith. As was the case with the Buddhists, group conversions were essential because those who remained in the Hindu caste system would have little to do with those who converted. Some conversions resulted from the desire of Hindus or Buddhists to escape the head tax the Muslim rulers levied on unbelievers. It was also prompted by intermarriage between local peoples and Muslim migrants. In addition, Muslim migrants swelled the size of the Islamic community in the subcontinent. This was particularly true in periods of crisis in central Asia. In the 13th and 14th centuries, for example, Turkic, Persian, and Afghan peoples retreated to the comparative safety of India in the face of the Mongol and Timurid conquests that are examined in detail in Chapter 14.

Patterns of Accommodation

Although Islam won many converts in certain areas and communities, it initially made little impression on the Hindu community as a whole. Despite military reverses and the imposition of Muslim political rule over large areas of the subcontinent, high-caste Hindus in particular saw the invaders as the bearers of an upstart religion and as polluting outcasts. Al-Biruni, one of the chief chroniclers of the Muslim conquests, complained openly about the prevailing Indian disdain for the newcomers:

The Hindus believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no kings like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs. They are haughty, foolishly vain, self-conceited and stolid.

Many Hindus were willing to take positions as administrators in the bureaucracies of Muslim overlords or as soldiers in their armies and to trade with Muslim merchants. But they remained socially aloof from their conquerors. Separate living quarters were established everywhere Muslim communities developed. Genuine friendships between members of high-caste groups and Muslims were rare, and sexual liaisons between them were severely restricted.

During the early centuries of the Muslim influx, the Hindus were convinced that like so many of the peoples who had entered the subcontinent in the preceding millennia, the Muslims would soon be absorbed by the superior religions and more sophisticated cultures of India. Many signs pointed to that outcome. Hindus staffed the bureaucracies and made up a good portion of the armies of Muslim rulers. In addition, Muslim princes adopted regal styles and practices that were Hindu-inspired and contrary to the Quran. Some Muslim rulers proclaimed themselves to be of divine descent, and others minted coins decorated with Hindu images such as Nandi, the bull associated with a major Hindu god, Shiva.

More broadly, Muslim communities became socially divided along caste lines. Recently arrived Muslims generally were on top of the hierarchies that developed, and even they were divided depending on whether they were Arab, Turk, or Persian. High-caste Hindu converts came next, followed by “clean” artisan and merchant groups. Lower-caste and untouchable converts remained at the bottom of the social hierarchy. This may help to explain why conversions in these groups were not as numerous as one would expect given the original egalitarian thrust of Islam. Muslims also adopted Indian foods and styles of dress and took to chewing pan, or limestone wrapped with betel leaves.

The Muslim influx had unfortunate consequences for women in both Muslim and Hindu communities. The invaders increasingly adopted the practice of marrying women at the earlier ages favored by the Hindus and the prohibitions against the remarriage of widows found especially at the high-caste levels of Indian society. Some upper “caste” Muslim groups even performed the ritual of sati, the burning of widows on the same funeral pyres as their deceased husbands, which was found among some high-caste Hindu groups.

Islamic Challenge and Hindu Revival

Despite a significant degree of acculturation to Hindu lifestyles and social organization, Muslim migrants to the subcontinent held to their own distinctive religious beliefs and rituals. The Hindus found Islam impossible to absorb and soon realized that they were confronted by an actively proselytizing religion with
great appeal to large segments of the Indian population. Partly in response to this challenge, the Hindus placed greater emphasis on the devotional cults of gods and goddesses that earlier had proved so effective in neutralizing the challenge of Buddhism.

Membership in these devotional, or bhakti, cult groups was open to all, including women and untouchables. In fact, some of the most celebrated writers of religious poetry and songs of worship were women, such as Mira Bai. Saints from low-caste origins were revered by warriors and brahmans as well as by farmers, merchants, and outcastes. One of the most remarkable of these mystics was a Muslim weaver named Kabir. In plain and direct verse, Kabir played down the significance of religious differences and proclaimed that all could provide a path to spiritual fulfillment. He asked,

O servant, where do thou seek Me?
Lo! I am beside thee.
I am neither in temple nor in mosque:
Neither am I in rites and ceremonies, nor in Yoga and renunciation.

Because many songs and poems, such as those by Mira Bai and Kabir, were composed in regional languages, such as Bengali, Marathi, and Tamil, they were more accessible to the common people and became prominent expressions of popular culture in many areas.

Bhakti mystics and gurus stressed the importance of a strong emotional bond between the devotee and the god or goddess who was the object of veneration. Chants, dances, and in some instances drugs were used to reach the state of spiritual intoxication that was the key to individual salvation. Once one had achieved the state of ecstasy that came through intense emotional attachment to a god or goddess, all past sins were removed and caste distinctions were rendered meaningless. The most widely worshiped deities were the gods Shiva and Vishnu, the latter particularly in the guise of Krishna the goatherder, depicted in the folk painting in Figure 7.6. The goddess Kali was also venerated in a number of different manifestations. By increasing popular involvement in Hindu worship and by enriching and extending the modes of prayer and ritual, the bhakti movement may have done much to stem the flow of converts to Islam, particularly among low-caste groups. Once again, the Hindu tradition demonstrated its remarkable adaptability and tolerance for widely varying modes of worship.

Stand-Off: The Muslim Presence in India at the End of the Sultanate Period

The attempts of mystics such as Kabir to minimize the differences between Hindu and Islamic beliefs and worship won over only small numbers of the followers of either faith. They were also strongly repudiated by the guardians of orthodoxy in each religious community. Sensing the long-term threat to Hinduism posed by Muslim political dominance and conversion efforts, the brahmans denounced the Muslims as infidel destroyers of Hindu temples and polluted meat-eaters. Later Hindu mystics, such as the 15th-century holy man Chaitanya, composed songs that focused on love for Hindu deities and set out to convince Indian Muslims to renounce Islam in favor of Hinduism. For their part, Muslim ulama, or religious experts, grew increasingly aware of the dangers Hinduism posed for Islam. Attempts to fuse the two faiths were rejected on the grounds that although
Hindus might argue that specific rituals and beliefs were not essential, they were fundamental for Islam. If one played down the teachings of the Quran, prayer, and the pilgrimage, one was no longer a true Muslim. Thus, contrary to the teachings of Kabir and like-minded mystics, the ulama and even some Sufi saints stressed the teachings of Islam that separated it from Hinduism. They worked to promote unity within the Indian Muslim community and to strengthen its contacts with Muslims in neighboring lands and the Middle Eastern centers of the faith.

After centuries of invasion and migration, a large Muslim community had been established in the Indian subcontinent. Converts had been won, political control had been established throughout much of the area, and strong links had been forged with Muslims in other lands such as Persia and Afghanistan. But non-Muslims, particularly Hindus, remained the overwhelming majority of the population of the vast and diverse lands south of the Himalayas. Unlike the Zoroastrians in Persia or the animistic peoples of the Maghrib and the Sudan, most Indians showed little inclination to convert to the religion of the Muslim conquerors.

On the contrary, despite their subjugation, they remained convinced that they possessed a superior religion and civilization and that the Muslims would eventually be absorbed into the Hindu fold. The Muslim adoption of Hindu social forms and Indian customs certainly pointed in this direction. The teachings of Hindu and Muslim mystics threatened to blur the religious boundaries between the two faiths, a process that favored the ascendancy of the more flexible Hindu faith. Thus, Muslim conquests and migration had carried Islam into the heart of one of the most ancient and populous centers of civilization. But after centuries of Muslim political dominance and missionary activity, south Asia remained one of the least converted and integrated of all the areas Muhammad’s message had reached.

THE SPREAD OF ISLAM TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

The spread of Islam to various parts of coastal India set the stage for its further expansion to island southeast Asia. Arab traders and sailors regularly visited the ports of southeast Asia long before they converted to Islam. From the 13th century, these traders, and the Sufi mystics they sometimes carried aboard their ships, spread Islam to Java and much of the rest of island southeast Asia. As was the case in India, conversion was generally peaceful, and the new believers combined Islamic teachings and rituals with elements of the animist, Hindu, and Buddhist religions that had spread throughout the area in preceding centuries.

From a world history perspective, island southeast Asia had long been mainly a middle ground. It was the zone where the Chinese segment of the great Euro-Asian trading complex met the Indian Ocean trading zone to the west. At ports on the coast of the Malayan peninsula, east Sumatra, and somewhat later north Java, goods from China were transferred from east Asian vessels to Arab or Indian ships. In these same ports, products from as far west as Rome were loaded into the emptied Chinese ships to be carried to east Asia. By the 7th and 8th centuries C.E., sailors and ships from areas of southeast Asia, particularly Sumatra and Malaya, had become active in the seaborne trade of the region. Southeast Asian products had also become important exports to China, India, and the Mediterranean region. Many of these products were luxury items, such as aromatic woods from the rainforests of Borneo and Sumatra and spices such as cloves, nutmeg, and mace from the far end of the Indonesian archipelago. These trading links were to prove even more critical to the expansion of Islam in southeast Asia than they had earlier been to the spread of Buddhism and Hinduism.

From the 8th century onward, the coastal trade of India came increasingly to be controlled by Muslims from such regions as Gujarat in western India and various parts of south India. As a result, elements of Islamic culture began to filter into island southeast Asia. But only in the 13th century, after the collapse of the far-flung trading empire of Shrivijaya, centered on the Strait of Malacca between Malaya and the north east of Sumatra (see Map 7.2), was the way open for the widespread introduction of Islam. Indian traders, Muslim or otherwise, were welcome to trade in the chain of ports controlled by Shrivijaya. But because the rulers and officials of Shrivijaya were devout Buddhists, there was little incentive for the traders and sailors of southeast Asian ports to convert to Islam, the religion of growing numbers of the merchants and sailors from India. With the fall of Shrivijaya, incentives increased for the establishment of Muslim trading centers and efforts to preach the faith to the coastal peoples.
Trading Contacts and Conversion

As in most of the areas to which Islam spread, peaceful contacts and voluntary conversion were far more important than conquest and force in spreading the faith in southeast Asia. Throughout the islands of the region, trading contacts paved the way for conversion. Muslim merchants and sailors introduced local peoples to the ideas and rituals of the new faith and impressed on them how much of the known world had already been converted. Muslim ships also carried Sufis to various parts of southeast Asia, where they played as vital a role in conversion as they had in India. The first areas to be won to Islam in the late 13th century were several small port centers on the northern coast of Sumatra. From these ports, the religion spread in the centuries that followed across the Strait of Malacca to Malaya.

On the mainland, the key to widespread conversion was the powerful trading city of Malacca, whose smaller trading empire had replaced the fallen Shrivijaya. From Malacca, Islam spread along the coasts of Malaya to east Sumatra and to the trading center of Demak on the north coast of Java. From Demak, the most powerful of the trading states on north Java, the Muslim faith spread to other Javanese ports. After a long struggle with a Hindu–Buddhist kingdom in the interior, the rest of the island was eventually converted. From Demak, Islam was also carried to the Celebes and the spice islands in the eastern archipelago, and from the latter to Mindanao in the southern Philippines.

This progress of Islamic conversion shows that port cities in coastal areas were particularly receptive to the new faith. Here trading links were critical. Once one of the key cities in a trading cluster converted, it was in the best interest of others to follow suit to enhance personal ties and provide a common basis in Muslim law to regulate business deals. Conversion to Islam also linked these centers, culturally as well as economically, to the merchants and ports of India, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean.

Islam made slow progress in areas such as central Java, where Hindu–Buddhist dynasties contested its spread. But the fact that the earlier conversion to these Indian religions had been confined mainly to the ruling elites in Java and other island areas left openings for mass conversions to Islam that the Sufis eventually exploited. The island of Bali, where Hinduism had taken deep root at the popular level, remained largely impervious to the spread of Islam. The same was true of most of mainland southeast Asia, where centuries before the coming of Islam, Buddhism had spread from India and Ceylon and won the fervent adherence of both the ruling elites and the peasant masses.

Sufi Mystics and the Nature of Southeast Asian Islam

Because Islam came to southeast Asia primarily from India and was spread in many areas by Sufis, it was often infused with mystical strains and tolerated earlier animist, Hindu, and Buddhist beliefs and rituals. Just as they had in the Middle East and India, the Sufis who spread Islam in southeast Asia varied widely in personality and approach. Most were believed by those who followed them to have magical powers, and nearly all Sufis established mosque and school centers from which they traveled in neighboring regions to preach the faith.

In winning converts, the Sufis were willing to allow the inhabitants of island southeast Asia to retain pre-Islamic beliefs and practices that orthodox scholars would have found contrary to Islamic doctrine. Pre-Islamic customary law remained important in regulating social interaction, whereas Islamic law was confined to specific sorts of agreements and exchanges. Women retained a much stronger position, both within the family and in society, than they had in the Middle East and India. For example, trading in local and regional markets continued to be dominated by small-scale female buyers and sellers. In such areas as western Sumatra, lineage and inheritance continued to be traced through the female line after the coming of Islam, despite its tendency to promote male dominance and descent. Perhaps most tellingly, pre-Muslim religious beliefs and rituals were incorporated into Muslim ceremonies. Indigenous cultural staples, such as the brilliant Javanese puppet shadow plays that were based on the Indian epics of the brahmanic age, were refined, and they became even more central to popular and elite beliefs and practices than they had been in the pre-Muslim era.

Conversion and Accommodation in the Spread of World Religions

Although not all great civilizations have produced world religions, the two tend to be closely associated throughout human history. World reli-
gions are those that spread across many cultures and societies, forge links between civilized centers, and bring civilized lifestyles to nomadic pastoral or shifting-cultivating peoples. Religions with these characteristics appeared before the rise of Islam. As we have seen, India alone produced two of these faiths in ancient times: Hinduism, which spread to parts of southeast and central Asia, and Buddhism, which spread even more widely in the Asian world. At the other end of the Eastern Hemisphere, Christianity spread throughout the Mediterranean region before claiming northern and western Europe as its core area. Judaism spread not because it won converts in non-Jewish cultures but because the Jewish people were driven from their homeland by Roman persecution and scattered throughout the Middle East, north Africa, and Europe.

Because religious conversion affects all aspects of life, from the way one looks at the universe to more mundane decisions about whom to marry or how to treat others, a world religion must be broad and flexible enough to accommodate the existing culture of potential converts. At the same time, its core beliefs and practices must be well enough defined to allow its followers to maintain a clear sense of common identity despite their great differences in culture and society. Christianity, for example, appealed to educated people, as it adopted a complex set of ideas about God and life. Its spirituality and its promise of eternal life also appealed to many other groups.

Until the 16th century, when Christianity spread through the Western Hemisphere, no world religion could match Islam in the extent to which it spread across the globe and in the diversity of peoples and cultures that identified themselves as Muslims. Given its uncompromising monotheism, very definite doctrines, and elaborate rituals and principles of social organization, Islam’s success at winning converts from very different cultural backgrounds is surprising at first glance. This is particularly true if it is compared with the much more flexible beliefs and ceremonial patterns of earlier world religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism. However, closer examination reveals that Islamic beliefs and social practices, as written in the Quran and interpreted by the ulama, proved quite flexible and adaptable when the religion was introduced into new, non-Islamic cultures. Like all world religions, Islam could adjust to widely varying cultural norms and modes of expression even as it was converting the peoples of these cultures to a common set of religious beliefs, ritual forms, and social practices.

The fact that Islam won converts overwhelmingly through peaceful contacts between long-distance traders and the preaching and organizational skills of Sufis exemplifies this capacity for accommodation. Those adopting the new religion did not do so because they were pressured or forced to convert but because they saw Islam as a way to enhance their understanding of the supernatural, enrich their ceremonial expression, improve the quality of their social interaction, and establish ongoing links to a transcultural community beyond their local world.

Those who converted had a good deal to say about how much of their own cultures they would change and which aspects of Islam they would emphasize or accept. Certain beliefs and practices were obligatory for all true believers—the worship of a single god, adherence to the prophet Muhammad and the divine revelations he received as recorded in the Quran, and the observance of the five pillars of the faith. But even these were subject to reinterpretation. In virtually all cultures to which it spread, Islamic monotheism supplanted but did not eradicate the animistic veneration of nature spirits or person and place deities. Allah was acknowledged as the most powerful supernatural force, but people continued to make offerings to spirits that could heal, bring fertility, protect their homes, or punish their enemies. In such areas as Africa and western China, where the veneration of ancestral spirits was a key aspect of religious life, the spirits were retained not as powers in themselves but as emissaries to Allah. In cultures such as those found in India and southeast Asia, Islamic doctrines were recast in a heavily mystical, even magical mode.

The flexibility of Islam was exhibited in the social as well as the religious sphere. In Islamic southeast Asia and, as we shall see in Chapter 8, in sub-Saharan Africa, the position of women remained a good deal stronger in critical areas, such as occupation and family law, than it had become in the Middle East and India. In both
regions, the male-centric features of Islam that had grown more pronounced through centuries of accommodation in ancient Middle Eastern and Persian cultures were played down as Islam adapted to societies where women had traditionally enjoyed more influence, both within the extended family and in occupations such as farming, marketing, and craft production. Even the caste system of India, which in principle is opposed to the strong egalitarian strain in Islam, developed among Muslim groups that migrated into the subcontinent and survived in indigenous south Asian communities that converted to Islam.

Beyond basic forms of social organization and interaction, Islam accommodated diverse aspects of the societies into which it spread. For example, the African solar calendar, which was essential for coordinating the planting cycle, was retained along with the Muslim lunar calendar. In India, Hindu–Buddhist symbols of kingship were appropriated by Muslim rulers and acknowledged by both their Hindu and Muslim subjects. In island southeast Asia, exquisitely forged knives, called krises, which were believed to have magical powers, were among the most treasured possessions of local rulers both before and after they converted to Islam.

There was always the danger that accommodation could go too far—that in winning converts, Islamic principles would be so watered down and remolded that they no longer resembled or actually contradicted the teachings of the Quran. Sects that came to worship Muhammad or his nephew Ali as godlike, for example, clearly violated fundamental Muslim principles. This danger was a key source of the periodic movements for purification and revival that have been a notable feature of nearly all Islamic societies, particularly those on the fringes of the Islamic world. But even these movements, which were built around the insistence that the Muslim faith had been corrupted by alien ideas and practices and that a return to Islamic fundamentals was needed, were invariably cast in the modes of cultural expression of the peoples who rallied to them. What was considered fundamental varied according to culture, and perhaps more important, the ways in which basic beliefs were interpreted and rituals enacted differed significantly from one Islamic culture to the next.

**Questions:** Can you think of ways in which world religions, such as Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism, changed to accommodate the cultures and societies to which they spread? Do these religions strike you as more or less flexible than Islam? Why? Do you think it is possible for a set of religious beliefs and practices to become a world religion without changing as it moves from one culture to the next? If not, why not? If so, can you think of a religion that has?

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**Conclusion**

**The Legacy of the Abbasid Age**

Although problems of political control and succession continued to plague the kingdoms and empires that divided the Muslim world, the central position of Islamic civilization in global history was solidified during the centuries of Abbasid rule. Its role as the go-between for the more ancient civilizations of the Eastern Hemisphere grew as Arab trading networks expanded into new areas. More than ever, it enriched the lives of nomadic peoples, from the Turks and Mongols of central Asia to the Berbers of north Africa and the camel herders of the Sudan. Equally critically, Islam’s original contributions to the growth and refinement of civilized life greatly increased. From its great cities and universities and the accomplishments they generated in the fine arts, sciences, and literature to its vibrant religious and philosophical life, Islam pioneered patterns of organization and thinking that would affect the development of human societies in major ways for centuries to come.

In the midst of all this achievement, however, there were tendencies that would put the Muslim peoples at a growing disadvantage, particularly in relation to their long-standing European rivals. Muslim divisions would leave openings for political expansion that the Europeans would eagerly exploit, beginning with the island southeast Asian extremities of the Islamic world and then moving across north India. The growing orthodoxy and intolerance of the ulama, as well as the Muslim belief that the vast Islamic world contained all requirements for civilized life, caused Muslim peoples to grow less receptive to outside influences and innovations. These tendencies became increasingly pronounced at precisely the time when their Christian rivals were entering a period of unprecedented curiosity, experimentation, and exploration of the world beyond their own heartlands.